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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________________ 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
 This is an appeal from a district court's judgment 
predicated on its opinion holding that an employer violates the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") by offering to all 
employees terminated as a result of a reduction-in-force (RIF) 
enhanced severance benefits in return for a general release of 
all claims, including ADEA claims, against the employer.  We 
conclude that such a practice does not violate the ADEA, and 
therefore we will reverse the judgment of the district court.  
Because there is no basis for further proceedings in this case, 
we will remand the matter to the district court with instructions 
to enter judgment for the defendant. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION, FACTUAL BACKGROUND, AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
  
 The germane facts are not disputed.1  In 1990, the 
employer, defendant SmithKline Beecham Corporation (SmithKline), 
a Philadelphia-based pharmaceutical company, consolidated four 
computer data centers it operated throughout Pennsylvania and in 
Tennessee into a single center at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.  
Prior to the consolidation, SmithKline employed plaintiff John 
DiBiase as a first-shift supervisor of computer operators at its 
Philadelphia data center.  With the consolidation, he moved to 
King of Prussia, where six supervisors remained employed, working 
two per shift, with each pair overseeing three to five computer 
operators.  Between late 1991 and early 1992, SmithKline decided 
to reduce the staff of this division, and it assessed the 
concomitant consequences.  Specifically, the data center's 
personnel manager "prepared an 'adverse impact analysis' 
examining the gender, race, and age of the shift supervisors to 
determine if any adverse impact would result from the planned 
reduction in staff."  DiBiase, 847 F. Supp. at 343.  On February 
1, 1992, SmithKline decided to lay off DiBiase and one other 
shift supervisor and it informed DiBiase of this decision the 
next day.  At that time, he was 51 years old. 
 SmithKline offered employees terminated in a RIF a 
separation benefit plan, which provided a lump sum payment based 
on the employee's length of service, as well as continued health 
                     
1
.  Unless otherwise noted, we take the facts from the district 
court opinion.  DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 847 F. Supp. 
341 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
  
and dental benefits.  Specifically, the basic plan provided 12 
months salary and three months continued benefits.  Additionally, 
the plan offered enhanced benefits to employees willing to sign a 
general release of all claims against SmithKline.  Terminated 
employees who signed the release were entitled to receive 15 
months salary and six months continued health and dental 
coverage.  The release is in large part the subject of this 
appeal, and it stated in pertinent part: 
  In consideration of the monies and other 
consideration to be received by me under the 
SmithKline Beecham Separation Program, I 
hereby irrevocably and unconditionally 
release, waive and forever discharge 
SmithKline Beecham Corporation, its 
affiliates, parents, successors, 
predecessors, subsidiaries, assigns, 
directors, officers, employees, 
representatives, agents, and attorneys . . . 
from any and all claims, agreements, causes 
of action, demands, or liabilities of any 
nature whatsoever . . . arising, occurring or 
existing at any time prior to the signing of 
this General Release, whether known or 
unknown. 
 
General release § 1 at app. 98.  The release provided that 
employees who sign it waive 
 [a]ny and all claims arising under federal, 
state, or local constitutions, laws, rules or 
regulations or common law prohibiting 
employment discrimination based upon age, 
race, color, sex, religion, handicap or 
disability, national origin or any other 
protected category or characteristic, 
including but not limited to any and all 
claims arising under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1866 or 1871, the National Labor 
  
Relations Act and/or under any other federal, 
state or local human rights, civil rights, or 
employment discrimination statute, rule or 
regulation. 
 
Release § 1 ¶2 at app. 98.  Prefatory language to the release 
cautioned employees that "YOU SHOULD THOROUGHLY REVIEW AND 
UNDERSTAND THE TERMS, CONDITIONS AND EFFECT OF THE SEPARATION 
PROGRAM AND OF THIS GENERAL RELEASE.  THEREFORE, PLEASE CONSIDER 
IT FOR AT LEAST TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS BEFORE SIGNING IT.  YOU ARE 
ADVISED TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY BEFORE YOU SIGN THIS GENERAL 
RELEASE."  Release at app. 98.  Under the terms of the release, 
employees were given seven calendar days after signing to revoke 
their signature.  Release at app. 99. 
 DiBiase declined to sign the release.  Instead, on 
April 29, 1992, he wrote a letter to William Mossett, 
SmithKline's personnel director, contending that SmithKline's 
policy violated the ADEA.  The letter reads in pertinent part: 
  So there can be no possible 
misunderstanding I am stating my position as 
follows. 
 
 *  *  * 
      As stated in my grievance I have reason 
to believe that the company violated federal 
and state age discrimination laws in 
terminating me.  I am declining the enhanced 
separation benefit package because I do not 
wish to give up my rights under these 
discrimination laws.  I believe that the 
company's policy of requiring persons over 
forty to release age discrimination claims 
against the company in order to secure 
enhanced separation benefits violates these 
age discrimination laws since persons under 
forty may elect to receive enhanced 
separation benefits determined by the same 
  
formula that applies to persons over forty 
without releasing potential age 
discrimination claims. 
 
Letter from DiBiase to Mossett of April 29, 1992, at app. 106, 
107.  Because DiBiase did not sign the release, SmithKline 
refused to give him the enhanced benefits.  See Letter from 
Tyrone Barber, SmithKline's Personnel Manager, to DiBiase of May 
4, 1992, at app. 108.  Still, DiBiase received the benefits due 
him under SmithKline's basic plan. Id. 
 On July 2, 1992, DiBiase filed an affidavit and charge 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging 
both that SmithKline terminated his employment because of his 
age, and that SmithKline's separation plan violated the ADEA 
because it treated older workers differently than younger workers 
by requiring them to release ADEA claims.  DiBiase EEOC aff. at 
app. 109-110.  On March 31, 1993, the EEOC determined that "there 
is not reasonable cause to believe that there has been a 
violation of the statute under which the charge has been filed."  
EEOC Determination at app. 67-68. 
 On June 14, 1993, DiBiase filed a complaint against 
SmithKline in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania.  His amended complaint contained two 
counts.  Count 1 asserted that SmithKline fired him because of 
his age, in violation of the ADEA.  Complaint ¶ 15-19 at app. 55-
56.  Count 2 alleged that SmithKline's "separation benefit plan 
violates ADEA because it discriminates against [him] and its 
  
other employees forty or older by having higher requirements for 
them to qualify for the additional separation benefits than apply 
to its employees under forty."  Complaint ¶ 29 at app. 58.  
DiBiase also asserted that SmithKline's actions underlying both 
counts were willful and that he was entitled to punitive and 
double damages.  Complaint ¶¶  19, 31 at app. 56, 59.  On August 
2, 1993, SmithKline moved to dismiss count 2 of the amended 
complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In a Memorandum 
opinion and order filed on September 29, 1993, the district court 
denied the motion.  The district court suggested that DiBiase 
might be able to show that even if SmithKline's plan was a 
"facially neutral employment" policy, it "had a significantly 
discriminatory impact."  Memorandum Op. at app. 47. 
 On December 20, 1993, SmithKline moved for summary 
judgment on both counts of DiBiase's complaint.  In an opinion 
and order dated March 15, 1994 -- entered the next day and 
reported at 847 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Pa. 1994) -- the district 
court granted the motion as to Count 1 and denied it as to Count 
2.  Specifically, the district court found that "no jury 
reasonably could conclude from the facts" that DiBiase had been 
replaced in his job.  847 F. Supp. at 346.  Inasmuch as DiBiase 
had not been replaced, the court concluded that he had failed to 
establish a prima facie case of wrongful termination under the 
  
ADEA.  Thus, the district court granted summary judgment to 
SmithKline on the termination count, count 1.2 
 However, the district court denied SmithKline's motion 
for summary judgment on count 2.  Specifically, the court found 
that the separation plan involved discriminatory treatment of 
older persons.  Relying on the ADEA section providing a cause of 
action only for persons at least 40 years old, see 29 U.S.C. § 
631(a), the district court observed that "[i]n order for an older 
employee to receive the same enhanced benefit as a younger 
employee, the older employee must release her right to file an 
ADEA claim."  DiBiase, 847 F. Supp. at 347.  The court further 
observed that "[t]his treatment is patently different because the 
younger employee cannot have an ADEA claim."  Id.  From these 
observations, the district court concluded that "SmithKline's 
policy facially discriminates" against employees protected by the 
ADEA.  Id. at 348.  Thus, the court denied SmithKline's motion. 
                     
2
.  Ordinarily, when employment is terminated as part of a RIF, 
the plaintiff need not prove that he or she was replaced by a 
worker outside the protected class.  Rather, to demonstrate a 
prima facie case "[i]n RIF cases, the plaintiff must show he was 
in the protected class, he was qualified, he was laid off and 
other unprotected workers were retained."  Armbruster v. Unisys 
Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).  Here, the district court 
found that "[p]laintiff cannot make such a showing, however, 
because all three retained employees . . . were within the 
protected class when plaintiff was terminated."  DiBiase, 847 F. 
Supp. at 345 n.5.  Thus, the district court used the standard for 
establishing a prima facie case in the typical age discrimination 
case.  We need not address whether the district court 
appropriately departed from traditional RIF analysis, because 
DiBiase has not appealed from the summary judgment on count 1. 
  
 On April 26, 1994, DiBiase made a cross-motion for 
summary judgment on count 2 of the amended complaint, based 
entirely on the district court's reasoning in its March 15, 1994 
opinion.3  On May 3, 1994, the district court granted this 
motion, "[f]or the reasons fully set forth in my March 15, 1994 
Opinion."  May 3, 1994 Order at n.1.  Because the parties had 
stipulated to damages under count 2, the district court entered 
judgment for DiBiase in the amount of $14,203.03.  Id. 4   
 Meanwhile, on December 16, 1993, DiBiase had filed 
another action alleging that SmithKline had retaliated against 
him for pursuing his rights under the ADEA.  On December 22, 
1993, the district court consolidated the two actions.  The 
parties settled the retaliation claim, and on April 29, 1994, the 
district court signed a stipulation and order (entered on May 2, 
1994) dismissing that claim with prejudice.  Thus, the May 3, 
1994 order granting DiBiase's motion for summary judgment on 
count 2 concluded the proceedings before the district court.  
SmithKline timely filed a notice of appeal.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and the district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  
                     
3
.  Technically this motion was not a cross-motion, since it was 
made after the district court's order on the original motion.  
Nonetheless, the district court, the parties and the docket sheet 
describe it as a "cross-motion" and we follow suit. 
4
.  It is unclear how the parties arrived at this figure.   
  
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's 
grant of summary judgment, Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. 
Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 554 (1993), and, because the facts are 
undisputed, we decide the appeal as a matter of law. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Introduction 
 This case involves the scope of liability under the 
ADEA, a federal anti-discrimination statute that renders it 
unlawful for an employer: 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual or otherwise discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's age;  
 
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's age. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).5  With these provisions, "[t]he ADEA 'broadly 
prohibits arbitrary discrimination in the workplace based on 
age.'"  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 
                     
5
.  We generally rely on both ADEA cases and cases arising under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et 
seq., because "Title VII and the ADEA have been given parallel 
constructions due to their similarities in purpose and 
structure."  Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 
1380, 1385 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  
120, 105 S.Ct. 613, 621 (1985) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 
U.S. 575, 577, 98 S.Ct. 866, 868 (1978)).6  In a "privilege of 
employment" case such as this one, it is irrelevant that 
SmithKline had no obligation to provide the particular benefit to 
its employees, for once an employer decides to grant an 
opportunity to some, "it may not deny this opportunity to others 
because of their age."  Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 S.Ct. at 
621.  As the Supreme Court has explained, "'[a] benefit that is 
part and parcel of the employment relationship may not be doled 
out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be 
free . . . not to provide the benefit at all.'"  Id. (alteration 
in original) (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75, 
104 S.Ct. 2229, 2233-34 (1984)).   
 SmithKline argues in the first instance that Congress, 
in enacting the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
101-43, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (OWBPA), explicitly considered and 
rejected a provision entitling older workers to extra 
consideration for release of ADEA claims.7  The OWBPA set forth, 
                     
6
.  As noted above, however, the statute provides that "[t]he 
prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who 
are at least 40 years of age."  29 U.S.C. § 631(a). 
7
.  Somewhat inexplicably, at oral argument DiBiase vigorously 
denied that his theory of the case required employers to provide 
extra consideration to older workers signing general releases.  
To the contrary, he said that a provision for extra consideration 
would violate the ADEA as well and that the only way in which 
older people would be treated the same as younger people would be 
to allow older people to sign a release agreeing to waive all 
claims except those under the ADEA. 
  
  
among other things, specific standards governing whether an 
employee's waiver of ADEA claims is valid.  See 29 U.S.C. § 
626(f).  SmithKline points out that early drafts of the OWBPA 
provided that a waiver of ADEA claims is valid only when: 
 the rights or claims are waived in exchange 
for consideration in addition to anything of 
value -- 
 
  (ii) that has been offered to a group or 
class of individuals under an early 
retirement incentive or other employment 
termination program. 
 
See 135 Cong. Rec. § 289-01, § 356-57 (introduction of bill in 
Senate); 135 Cong. Rec. H 696-03, H 697 (introduction of bill in 
House of Representatives).  SmithKline is correct in noting that 
(..continued) 
 However, this case has proceeded on the assumption that 
DiBiase was claiming extra consideration.  In ruling on 
SmithKline's motion to dismiss, the district court stated that 
DiBiase "argues that an employer could secure a release of ADEA 
claims by offering additional consideration beyond that offered 
for a release of all claims except ADEA claims."  Memorandum of 
September 27, 1993, at app. 47.  Similarly, the district court 
commented in its opinion that "I have difficulty believing that 
the widespread industry practice of offering enhanced benefits in 
exchange for a release of potential claims is so fragile that a 
decision requiring additional consideration for a valid release 
of ADEA claims will cause the practice to expire."  DiBiase, 847 
F. Supp. at 351.  In short, the district court certainly believed 
that DiBiase was asking for extra consideration. 
 
 At any rate, unless DiBiase is arguing that an employer 
never could secure a valid general release from a terminated 
employee protected by the ADEA, we perceive no analytical 
distinction between a claim for extra consideration and a claim 
that DiBiase should have been allowed to waive all claims except 
ADEA claims in exchange for the enhanced benefits.  Both 
arguments seek special treatment.  In the former situation, the 
older worker receives extra money.  In the latter situation, the 
older employee preserves his or her ADEA claims. 
  
Congress did not include the provision in the OWBPA.  This 
history supporting SmithKline's position is significant and is 
entitled to some weight.  See United States v. Alcan Aluminum 
Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264-65 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, we do not 
rely primarily on legislative history in resolving this case 
because, as the following discussion shows, it is evident that 
even if we disregard the history we must conclude that 
SmithKline's policy did not violate the substantive provisions of 
the ADEA. 
 With this said, we now assess whether SmithKline's 
policy of providing enhanced benefits only to terminated 
employees signing the release violated the ADEA.  A policy can be 
discriminatory because of its treatment of or impact on 
employees.  In a disparate treatment case "'[t]he employer simply 
treats some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion [or other protected characteristics].'"  
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, ____ U.S. ____, ____, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 
1705 (1993) (first alteration added) (quoting Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1855 n.15 (1977)).  
On the other hand, disparate impact liability "'involve[s] 
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment 
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one 
group than another and cannot be justified by business 
necessity.'"  Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 97 
S.Ct. at 1855 n.15). 
  
 DiBiase contends -- and the district court found -- 
that older workers who signed SmithKline's release gave up more 
claims than younger workers who signed the release, since older 
workers, unlike younger workers, are protected by the ADEA.  
Because the argument is framed to contend that SmithKline treated 
older persons less favorably than younger persons, this 
articulation of the claim falls under the rubric of "disparate 
treatment."   
 
 B.  Disparate treatment 
 As the Supreme Court has noted, "'[d]isparate treatment 
. . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.'"  
Hazen, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1705 (alteration added) 
(quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 n.15).  
A successful disparate treatment case prevents an employer from 
intentionally engaging in discrimination or grants a remedy 
against it for such conduct.  Thus, "[d]isparate treatment . . . 
captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the 
ADEA."  Id. at    , 113 S.Ct. at 1706.  For example, as the 
Supreme Court pointed out when considering an employment 
termination case, "[i]t is the very essence of age discrimination 
for an older employee to be fired because the employer believes 
that productivity and competence decline with old age."  Id.  In 
a disparate treatment case, the trier of fact asks not whether 
the employer's otherwise nondiscriminatory policy has some 
  
adverse effect on members of the protected class, but rather, "is 
'the employer . . . treating "some people less favorably than 
others because of their [age]."'"   U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482 
(1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949 (1978) (second internal 
quotation omitted)).  Usually, disparate treatment involves an 
ad-hoc decision to treat an individual adversely because he or 
she is in a particular protected class.  For example, in Anderson 
v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 578, 105 S.Ct. 1504 (1985), 
the district court found disparate treatment liability based on 
sex when a city refused to hire a qualified woman for the 
position of recreation director.  Id. at 580, 105 S.Ct. at 1515.  
"Whatever the employer's decision-making process, a disparate 
treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected 
trait actually played a role in that process and had a 
determinative influence on the outcome."  Id. at ____, 113 S.Ct. 
at 1706.  Nonetheless, the district court found, and DiBiase 
argues, that he did not have to meet this test, because the 
policy constitutes explicit facial discrimination. 
 We agree that when a policy facially discriminates on 
the basis of the protected trait, in certain circumstances it 
"may constitute per se or explicit [age] discrimination."  EEOC 
v. Elgin Teachers Ass'n, 780 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 
1991).  And, "[w]hether an employment practice involves disparate 
  
treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not depend 
on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit 
terms of the discrimination."  Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199, 111 S.Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991).  
This is because, in a facial disparate treatment case, the 
protected trait by definition plays a role in the decision-making 
process, inasmuch as the policy explicitly classifies people on 
that basis.  Thus, when the policy itself displays the unlawful 
categorization, the employee is relieved from independently 
proving intent.  See Hazen, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1705 
(while "'proof of discriminatory motive is critical, . . . it can 
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences 
in treatment. . . .'") (citation omitted). 
 The district court based its conclusion that the policy 
constitutes facial discrimination on the following reasoning.  
The ADEA provides a cause of action only to persons age 40 or 
older.  By its terms, then, the ADEA differentiates employees on 
the basis of age, and leaves younger workers unprotected by the 
statute.8  Thus, on their 40th birthday, workers gain a 
substantive, valuable right.  By contrast, nearly all other 
judicially enforceable rights apply to all persons, not to 
                     
8
.  As one court has noted, "[t]he House Report for [the ADEA] 
cited the example of airline stewardesses, who must apparently 
'retire' by the age of 32, as people beset by an obvious age 
discrimination problem, yet who will have no remedy under the 
[ADEA]."  Kodish v. United Airlines, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1245, 
1249 (D. Colo. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1980). 
  
persons whose immutable characteristic falls in a particular 
category.  For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
protects not just black workers, but whites as well.  Males as 
well as females may bring successful gender-discrimination suits.  
And, in states with statutes prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, presumably heterosexuals are 
protected as well as homosexuals.  The district court next 
reasoned that, because the ADEA does not protect younger workers, 
while these other rights apply to all, older workers by 
definition hold a total number of rights greater than the total 
number of rights younger workers hold.  Hence, if younger workers 
hold rights with the total value of x, older workers have x + 1 
rights.  In light of this analysis, the court reasoned that older 
terminated workers have more accrued claims to give up than 
younger workers.  Thus, in order to comply with the ADEA, 
SmithKline should have given extra consideration to older workers 
because by signing the release they were giving up more claims 
than younger workers.  Accordingly, the court concluded that, by 
treating older workers the same as younger workers, SmithKline 
facially and explicitly discriminated on the basis of age. 
 We reject the district court's reasoning and thus we 
hold that it erred in concluding that SmithKline's policy is 
facially discriminatory and therefore constitutes per se 
discrimination.  The touchstone of explicit facial discrimination 
is that the discrimination is apparent from the terms of the 
  
policy itself.  In Thurston, for example, an airline company's 
policy constituted facial discrimination independent of proof of 
intent because it allowed all disqualified pilots automatically  
to be transferred to the position of flight engineer except those 
disqualified on the basis of age.  Thurston, 469 U.S. at 121, 105 
S.Ct. at 622.  In Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197, 111 S.Ct. at 
1202, the policy at issue violated Title VII because it 
"exclude[d] women with childbearing capacity from lead-exposed 
jobs and so create[d] a facial classification based on gender."   
Similarly, Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 
U.S. 702, 98 S.Ct. 1370 (1978), prohibited a policy that facially 
"require[d] 2,000 individuals to contribute more money into a 
fund than 10,000 other employees simply because each of them 
[was] a woman, rather than a man."  Id. at 711, 98 S.Ct. at 1377. 
 But SmithKline's policy does not fall within that 
limited category of cases.  Its plan cannot be said to be 
discriminatory on its face, because the district court's 
conclusion that the plan is facially discriminatory required 
referencing a fact outside the policy -- namely the ADEA.  
Consider the district court's holding:  "Because ADEA provides a 
cause of action for age discrimination only to persons age forty 
and above, the Plan explicitly treats older employees differently 
than younger employees."  DiBiase, 847 F. Supp. at 347.  But the 
word "explicitly" does not belong.  It is impossible to examine 
SmithKline's policy and conclude that on its face it treats older 
  
workers disparately.  There is a good reason for this -- the 
policy does not classify persons on the basis of age.  On the 
contrary, the plan offering is an archetypical example of a 
facially non-discriminatory policy.  SmithKline made the expanded 
package available to all persons willing to sign the release, 
regardless of age.  SmithKline did not require employees to waive 
only ADEA claims, but to waive all claims.  A facially non-
discriminatory policy cannot be transformed into a facially 
discriminatory policy simply because of the existence of the 
ADEA.9 
                     
9
.    While our result is not dependent on this point, we observe 
that certain precedents suggest that the premise that only 
employees 40 or over have anything to surrender under the ADEA is 
wrong.  Thus, it has been held that employees under the age of 40 
may bring retaliation claims under section 4(d) of the ADEA, see 
Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 722 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (D. 
Kan. 1989).  Moreover, at least two courts have held that, 
despite the statutory provision to the contrary, workers under 
the age of 40 may have standing to sue for substantive age 
discrimination.  In Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of 
Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1301 (D.Md. 1981), rev'd on other 
grounds, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984), the court held that a 32- 
year old plaintiff had standing to challenge the company's early 
retirement policy because "[the standing] provision does no more 
than define the acts prohibited by the statute and would not 
deprive plaintiff . . . of standing in this case."  Id.  In Allen 
v. American Home Foods, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 1553, 1558 (N.D. Ind. 
1986), the court held that employees under 40 had standing to sue 
under the ADEA when they were terminated in the wake of a plant 
closing.  Our point is not that these cases were decided 
correctly, a conclusion we neither reach nor reject.  Rather, our 
point is that the provisions of the ADEA -- and how they are 
interpreted -- are outside an employer's control.  Moreover, the 
30-year old's suit certainly imposes costs upon the company, and 
once the suit is filed, it cannot be said that the costs will be 
contained by an early dismissal.  These facts make it even more 
difficult to make the blanket statement that older persons' 
  
 Thus, DiBiase is left with having to prove both unequal 
treatment and intent to discriminate.  See Hazen, ____ U.S. at 
____, 113 S.Ct. at 1705; Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 
782 (3d Cir. 1994); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 
1994).  The Supreme Court plainly has stated that "there is no 
disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the 
employer is some feature other than the employee's age."  Hazen, 
____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1705.  Here, the record does not 
contain even the slightest evidence of discriminatory motive.10   
 At any rate, even assuming the existence of a 
(..continued) 
claims are worth more than younger persons' claims.  See 
generally Typescript at 21-24. 
10
.  In Hazen, the Supreme Court held that discrimination based 
on pension eligibility (when pension eligibility was based on 
years of service) does not violate the ADEA despite the strong 
correlation between the two categories.  The Court did say, 
however, that "[w]e do not preclude the possibility that an 
employer who targets employees with a particular pension status 
on the assumption that these employees are likely to be older 
thereby engages in age discrimination.  Pension status may be a 
proxy for age . . . in the sense that the employer may suppose a 
correlation between the two factors and act accordingly."  Hazen, 
___ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1707.  Here, there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that SmithKline, by offering the general 
release, intended to target older workers.  In fact, its motive 
is quite obvious -- it wanted to protect itself against all 
litigation arising out of the RIF. 
 
 DiBiase also contends that the intent to discriminate 
can be inferred based on his letter to SmithKline charging 
SmithKline with violating the ADEA.  This is preposterous.  The 
logical consequence of the argument is that a terminated employee 
can manufacture an illicit intent on the part of the employer 
simply by telling the employer that he or she thinks the employer 
is violating an anti-discrimination law.   
  
  
legitimate factual dispute concerning SmithKline's motive, it 
simply did not discriminate against DiBiase on the basis of age. 
Again, we begin with the district court's reasoning.  The 
district court properly concluded that employees gain a valuable 
substantive right simply by turning 40 for the ADEA protects 
workers who are at least 40 years of age from age discrimination. 
29 U.S.C. § 631(a).  But the district court went on to reason 
that all 40-year old employees had accrued ADEA "claims" that 
necessarily rendered their bundle of accrued claims more valuable 
than younger employees' bundles.  Thus, the district court's 
reasoning assumes that all terminated employees with races or 
with genders have accrued potential Title VII claims against 
their former employers, and that terminated employees with sexual 
orientations have such potential claims under various relevant 
state laws.  The court's reasoning also assumes that all such 
accrued claims are equally valuable.  To take the principle where 
it logically leads, it is like saying every person has accrued a 
potential due process claim simply because he or she has been a 
person and hence has been protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth 
amendments.   
 This kind of reasoning is inappropriate because the 
ADEA claim was just one of a plethora of claims that SmithKline 
asked employees to waive.  Thus, the value of the accrued ADEA 
claim has to be weighed against the value of other accrued 
claims.  For instance, other things being equal, a terminated 
  
employee's potential accrued gender discrimination claim probably 
would be worth more if the employee were a woman, even though 
both men and women are protected by Title VII.  Similarly, 
assuming all other variables to be equal, a black employee's race 
discrimination claim may be worth more in the abstract than such 
a claim from a white employee.  Recognizing these possibilities 
inevitably leads us away from the abstract reasoning utilized by 
the district court into a more practical approach that recognizes 
that the value of a bundle of accrued claims depends on a myriad 
of factors including, among other things, the employee's work 
performance history, the circumstances surrounding the 
terminations, and the nature -- if any -- of the rehiring.  For 
example, a 35-year-old black employee terminated despite a 
stellar work performance record certainly has a more valuable 
claim under Title VII than a 55-year-old, fired because of 
incompetence, has under the ADEA.  In theory, if there were a 
market for accrued claims, terminated 40-year old employees would 
not receive automatically the highest bids, as buyers would want 
to know more facts about the circumstances surrounding individual 
terminations.  The point, of course, is that the district court's 
assumption, that because of the ADEA all 40-year old employees 
have a more valuable set of claims than younger workers, is 
simply wrong.   One cannot say in the first instance that the 50-
year-old's accrued "claims" are by definition worth more than 
others' accrued claims.   
  
 The fallacy in the district court's reasoning is in 
large part due to the conflation of the notion of a "right" with 
the notion of an accrued "claim."  A right to be free 
prospectively from certain forms of discrimination always is 
worth something; however, whether a person has accrued a claim 
based on a right depends entirely on what previously has 
occurred.  SmithKline did not ask its terminated employees to 
give up their statutorily or constitutionally created rights to 
be free prospectively of various forms of discrimination.  
Rather, the plan's focus was entirely retrospective, on whether 
the value of any claims -- by definition already accrued -- was 
worth surrendering for the enhanced benefits.  The significance 
of the distinction between a right and a claim is particularly 
demonstrated in this case because the district court found that 
DiBiase's substantive age discrimination claim had no merit. 
 In fact, the district court's reasoning and conclusion 
are at odds with propositions of law it acknowledges in its 
opinion.  The court correctly noted that the ADEA "focuses on 
individuals, and precludes treatment of individuals as simply 
components of an age-based class."  DiBiase, 847 F. Supp. at 347.  
By analogy, in Manhart, the pension policy violated Title VII 
despite the fact that it was based on legitimate actuarial 
calculations, because "the basic policy of the statute requires 
that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to 
classes."  Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709, 98 S.Ct. at 1376.  This is 
  
because "[p]ractices that classify employees in terms of 
religion, race, or sex [or age] tend to preserve traditional 
assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful scrutiny of 
individuals."  Id.  Yet the district court's reasoning turns this 
principle on its head.  Here, SmithKline enacted a policy that 
called for each individual to weigh the circumstances surrounding 
his or her discharge, and to make an informed decision about 
whether to sign the release or proceed with claims that, if they 
existed, already had accrued.  Thus, the policy certainly was 
fair to individuals.  Yet, the district court's opinion, by 
conflating prospective rights with accrued claims, ignored the 
variances in each individual's situation, and instead classified 
all persons who were at least 40 years old as being in the 
identical position.  The opinion thus reached a conclusion 
directly contrary to the policy it correctly enunciated. 
 We must emphasize that our result may have been 
different had there been no analytical distinction between the 
class of disadvantaged employees (assuming such a class) and the 
protected class -- that is, had older employees by definition 
given up more claims than younger employees.  In this regard, 
Hazen again is instructive.  Although the Court concluded that 
"age and years of service are analytically distinct,"  Hazen, 
____ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1707, it expressly declined to 
"consider the special case where an employee is about to vest in 
pension benefits as a result of his age, rather than years of 
  
service."  Hazen, ___ U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1707.  The 
correlation between age and pension status in that special case 
is materially different -- the terminated employee always will be 
a member of the protected class.  The point is important, because 
we would have faced a different situation if, for example, 
SmithKline conditioned the expanded separation package upon a 
waiver only of ADEA claims inasmuch as employees do in fact gain 
a substantive right when they turn 40.  Thus, assuming no 
knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the termination, the 
possibility that a terminated older employee actually has a 
viable age discrimination claim, is worth something (though 
probably not much) in the abstract.  It follows, then, that if 
SmithKline required terminated employees to give up only ADEA 
claims to obtain the enhanced benefits, older employees but not 
younger employees would be forced to give up something of 
value.11    
 In the foregoing scenario, SmithKline would have 
treated older workers differently than younger workers.  Thus, in 
EEOC v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 869 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1989), 
vacated and remanded, 493 U.S. 801, 110 S.Ct. 37 (1989), we held 
that a policy denying severance pay to laid-off employees who 
were eligible for early or selected retirement constituted 
discrimination on the basis of age.  There, the class of people 
eligible for early retirement always coincided with members of 
                     
11
.  But see footnote 9, supra. 
  
the protected class.  Id. at 705.12  But that is not the 
situation here and we decline to address how we would rule in 
such a case.  SmithKline conditioned the right to the expanded 
benefits on an employee's blanket waiver of all accrued claims; 
this treatment cannot be said to be disparate, because it is 
impossible to tell whose package of potential claims is more 
valuable.13  Therefore, in light of the above, DiBiase has no 
disparate treatment claim against SmithKline. 
                     
12
.  The Supreme Court remanded Westinghouse for reconsideration 
in light of Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 
492 U.S. 158, 109 S.Ct. 1854 (1989).  In Betts, the Supreme Court 
held that the then-existing section 4(f)(2) of the ADEA -- 
exempting from the ADEA's prohibitions "any bona fide employee 
benefit plan . . . which is not a subterfuge to evade the 
purposes of the Act" -- insulates bona fide plans from the 
purview of the ADEA "so long as the plan is not a method of 
discriminating in other, non-fringe-benefit aspects of the 
employment relationship."  Id. at 177, 109 S.Ct. at 2866.  
Congress since overruled Betts.  We cite Westinghouse solely for 
the proposition that when a company's policy distinguishes 
employees on the basis of a factor analytically indistinct from 
age, we would be faced with a different situation than that in 
this case. 
 
13
.  The National Employment Lawyers Association has filed an 
amicus brief relying in part on EEOC v. Board of Governors, 957 
F.2d 424 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 S.Ct. 299 
(1992).  In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that "a collective bargaining agreement provision 
that denies employees their contractual right to a grievance 
proceeding whenever the employee initiates a claim, including a 
claim of age-based discrimination, in an administrative or 
judicial forum", id. at 425, violates section 4(d) of the ADEA.  
Id. at 431.  Section 4(d) prohibits employers from retaliating 
against an employee "because such individual . . . has made a 
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding or litigation under this chapter."  29 
U.S.C. § 623(d).  The company's policy therefore commanded a 
violation of this provision anytime an employee filed an age 
  
  
 C.  Disparate Impact 
 1.  Whether DiBiase adequately has raised this issue 
 An amicus, the National Employment Lawyers Association 
(NELA), urges us to affirm the district court's judgment on the 
alternative theory of disparate impact.  In a disparate impact 
case, the plaintiff claims that the employment practice "has a 
disproportionate effect on older workers [and thus] violates the 
ADEA."  Hazen,     U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1710 (Kennedy, J. 
concurring).  While the district court indicated that it "need 
not determine whether the policy also constitutes disparate 
impact," DiBiase, 849 F. Supp. at 348 n.13, it nevertheless went 
on to say: 
 Disparate impact cases typically focus on 
statistical disparities between members of 
the protected and unprotected classes.  In 
this case, however, no statistics are 
necessary because all members of the age-
protected class must surrender potential age 
discrimination claims, whereas no member of 
the non-protected class has potential age 
discrimination claims to surrender.  Thus, a 
disparate impact analysis in this case 
involves arguments identical to those 
involved in the disparate treatment inquiry, 
and results in the same conclusion:  
SmithKline's policy causes a disparate impact 
because it specifies different treatment. 
 
Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in original).  The district 
court's observation about disparate impact assumes that older 
(..continued) 
discrimination charge with the EEOC.  This decision does not 
support DiBiase's position. 
  
workers signing the release gave up more than younger workers 
solely because the ADEA protects only older workers.  In light of 
our discussion above, that analysis is flawed fundamentally.  
Moreover, the district court's reasoning is somewhat circular -- 
in explaining why there is disparate impact liability, the court 
assumed the conclusion of its disparate treatment analysis.  That 
logical flaw makes the disparate impact analysis redundant: To 
say that there is disparate impact because there is disparate 
treatment is to say nothing at all.  Of course, if a policy is 
facially discriminatory, it has a disparate impact on the 
discriminated-against individuals.  Therefore, we reject the 
district court's disparate impact conclusion for the reasons 
detailed above.14 
 But the question remains -- should we still remand the 
matter for further proceedings (and perhaps further discovery) on 
a different type of disparate impact theory.  After all, to 
conduct a disparate impact analysis properly in this context, the 
court should have assumed that the release did not treat 
employees disparately, and then asked whether, in reality, the 
                     
14
.  The problem with the district court's analysis probably 
stems from the fact that the court explicitly indicated that it 
need not reach the issue of disparate impact.  See DiBiase, 849 
F. Supp. at 348 n.13; Br. Amicus Curiae of National Employment 
Lawyers Association at 7 (acknowledging that district court 
determined that it need not decide whether the severance plan 
constitutes unlawful disparate impact).  The language following 
the district court's disclaimer constituted simply a reflection 
on the import of the court's disparate treatment conclusion -- 
once a policy is deemed facially discriminatory, the policy has a 
disparate impact as well. 
  
policy had a disproportionate effect on older employees.  Such an 
inquiry, of course, would have required use of sophisticated 
statistical data, and DiBiase apparently was not inclined to take 
this path, as he produced no such evidence. 
   DiBiase does not urge us to reach this conclusion as 
an alternative way to uphold the district court's judgment if we 
reject the court's disparate treatment analysis.  Only the amicus 
argues that DiBiase's "ADEA claims are actionable under a 
disparate impact theory," NELA Br. at 7, but an "amicus may not 
frame the issues for appeal."  Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 
1383 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Sanchez-Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 
1571, 1581 n.9 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 
____ S.Ct. ____, 1004 U.S. LEXIS 7855 (1994).  Absent the 
existence of "substantial public interests" calling us to depart 
from the general rule, "we consider only issues argued in the 
briefs filed by the parties and not those argued in the briefs 
filed by interested nonparties."  Continental Ins. Cos. v. 
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977, 984 
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821, 109 S.Ct. 66 (1988); 
Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 862 (9th 
Cir. 1982).15  Therefore, because DiBiase is not pursuing a 
disparate impact claim, the issue is not before us. 
 
                     
15
.  SmithKline addresses disparate impact theory, apparently to 
protect itself lest we conclude that the district court 
adequately reached the issue. 
  
 2.  The availability of disparate impact theory in this case16 
 We note, however, that even if the issue properly were 
before us, disparate impact theory would not be applicable here. 
In a factual scenario remarkably like the one here, the Supreme 
Court held that there can be no disparate impact liability.  In 
Manhart, the City of Los Angeles argued that its pension policy 
requiring women to contribute greater amounts into a pension fund 
than men was mandated by Title VII itself, reasoning that "a 
gender-neutral pension plan would itself violate Title VII 
because of its disproportionately heavy impact on male 
employees."  Manhart, 435 U.S. at 710 n.20, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1376 
n.20.   The Court dismissed the argument out of hand: "Even under 
Title VII itself -- assuming disparate-impact analysis applies to 
fringe benefits -- the male employees would not prevail.  Even a 
completely neutral practice will inevitably have some 
disproportionate impact on one group or another. . . .  [T]his 
Court has never held . . . that discrimination must always be 
inferred from such consequences."  Id.  That case, like this one, 
involved an employer's grant of "fringe benefits."  There, the 
city argued that it was required to treat people unequally in 
order to treat them equally.  Here, DiBiase makes the identical 
argument -- that SmithKline was required to treat employees 
                     
16
.  Judge Becker does not join subsection II(C)(2) and II(C)(3) 
of the opinion.  He would say simply that DiBiase clearly abjured 
any intention to proceed under a disparate impact theory, and 
therefore there is no disparate impact claim before us. 
  
unequally in order to treat them equally.  Like in Manhart, the 
disparate treatment is alleged to be justified because older 
people as a group would otherwise pay more for the privilege than 
younger people.   
 Moreover, the facts of this case simply do not 
implicate the policies underlying disparate impact theory.  In 
the first place, as described in detail above, the policy does 
not per se affect older workers more harshly than younger 
workers.  Second, there is absolutely no evidence that the 
company's policy does in fact affect older people adversely.  
Third, even if it did, such a neutral policy -- which does not 
rely on an invidious stereotype about older employees, which 
clearly is not motivated by a discriminatory impulse, and which 
could be demonstrated to have a disparate impact only by the use 
of an incredibly sophisticated statistical analysis -- simply 
cannot be the basis of ADEA liability.  Fourth, this is not a 
case where finding liability would help eradicate the entrenched 
effects of past discrimination.  Finally, use of statistical 
evidence demonstrating a disproportionate impact will shed little 
light on the employer's motive.  In short, there can be no 
liability in this case based on disparate impact. 
 
 3.  Disparate impact theory under the ADEA17 
                     
17
.  Judge McKee does not join subsection II(C)(3) of the 
opinion, as he finds it unnecessary to consider the question of 
whether disparate impact theory liability is viable under the 
  
 Moreover, in the wake of Hazen, it is doubtful that 
traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of 
liability under the ADEA.  In Hazen, the Supreme Court stated 
that it was declining to decide whether an employer may be liable 
under the ADEA on a disparate impact theory.  Id. at ____, 113 
S.Ct. at 1706, id. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1710 (Kennedy, J. 
concurring); Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028 
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
Yet the analysis in Hazen casts considerable doubt on the 
viability of the theory.  And, in fact, we recently recognized 
that the existence of disparate impact theory under the ADEA is 
an open question.  See Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 772 n.4 ("Whether a 
disparate impact theory of liability is even available under ADEA 
has yet to be addressed by the Supreme Court.  In any event, 
because the district court has not yet addressed this issue, we 
think it would be inappropriate for us to consider it.").  
(Citations omitted).18 
(..continued) 
ADEA.  Therefore, Judge Greenberg writes this subsection only for 
himself. 
18
.  In Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937, 104 S.Ct. 348 (1983), we noted 
that "this court has never ruled on whether a plaintiff can 
establish a violation of the Act by showing disparate impact 
alone."  Id. at 120.  In MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 
1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944, 110 S.Ct. 349 
(1989), however, we said that "Title VII and ADEA liability can 
be found where facially neutral employment practices have a 
discriminatory effect or 'disparate impact' on protected groups, 
without proof that the employer adopted these practices with a 
discriminatory motive."  Id. at 1148.  That case is not 
controlling, however.  First, there the plaintiffs challenged 
  
 Three premises in the Hazen Court's analysis make the 
point.  First, though not explicitly deciding the viability of 
disparate impact liability under the ADEA, the Court did note 
that disparate treatment "captures the essence of what Congress 
sought to prohibit in the ADEA."  Hazen, ____ U.S. at ____, 113 
S.Ct. at 1706.  Second, the Court reasoned that "Congress' 
promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by its concern that older 
workers were being deprived of employment on the basis of 
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes."  Id.  Finally, the 
Court held that "[w]hen the employer's decision is wholly 
motivated by factors other than age, the problem of inaccurate 
and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears.  This is true even if 
the motivating factor is correlated with age . . . ."  Id.  In a 
pure disparate impact case, the employer's decision by definition 
is "wholly motivated by factors other than age."19  Thus, with 
the third premise, the Supreme Court apparently concluded that in 
(..continued) 
"the practice of favoring Korean nationals on the ground that it 
has the effect of discriminating against others on grounds of 
race or national origin."  Id.  Thus, the disparate impact 
allegation involved Title VII only, and the statement about the 
ADEA is pure dicta.  Second, the cases relied upon for the 
proposition were Title VII cases, and in light of our express 
statement in Massarsky that Title VII jurisprudence did not 
necessarily apply to the ADEA in this context, it is 
inconceivable that we simply would have applied disparate impact 
theory without analysis -- particularly when the application was 
not relevant to the decision.  Third, we decided MacNamara  
before Hazen, and subsequent Supreme Court authority necessarily 
controls. 
19
.  I am not concerned here with situations in which impact is 
used to prove intent to discriminate. 
  
such cases, the policies behind the ADEA are not implicated.  
With that said, it is difficult to see how disparate impact 
liability can survive the analysis. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and two 
district courts, relying in part on Hazen, recently held that 
disparate impact liability is unavailable under the ADEA.  EEOC 
v. Francis W. Parker School, 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994) 
("decisions based on criteria which merely tend to affect workers 
over the age of forty more adversely than workers under forty are 
not prohibited") (citing Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 
F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1993));  Martincic v. Urban Redevelopment 
Authority of Pittsburgh, 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1076-77 (W.D. Pa. 
1994) (holding that in light of Hazen, there can be no disparate 
impact liability under the ADEA), aff'd, No. 94-3235,     F.3d     
(3d Cir. Nov. 28, 1994) (table); Hiatt v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 
859 F. Supp. 1416, 1434 (D. Wyo. 1994) ("[I]t is inappropriate to 
incorporate the disparate impact theory of discrimination 
enumerated [by the Supreme Court in the Title VII context] into 
the ADEA.").20 
                     
20
.  Yet several courts of appeal have assumed that disparate 
impact liability applies under the ADEA.  See, e.g., Geller v. 
Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 
U.S. 945, 101 S.Ct. 2028 (1981); Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 
912 F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 
F.2d 1417, 1423-25 (9th Cir. 1990).  These cases were decided 
before Hazen, and none of them even purported to conduct any 
analysis of the issue.  Rather, they probably relied on the oft-
cited principle that interpretations of the ADEA parallel 
interpretations of Title VII.  Because Hazen, if nothing else at 
least disposes of that assumption, those cases are not 
persuasive.  However, even after Hazen, the Court of Appeals for 
  
 The Hazen Court's emphasis on the congressional purpose 
behind the ADEA is particularly helpful in confirming the Court's 
intimations.  First, the statutory language does not explicitly 
provide for disparate impact liability.  While it has been argued 
that section 623(a)(2) authorizes claims of disparate impact, see 
Marla Ziegler, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 68 Minn. L. Rev. 1038, 1050-51 
(1984), that reading of the statute is inaccurate.  The section 
renders it "unlawful for an employer --- 
 (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his 
employees in any way which would deprive or 
tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect 
his status as an employee, because of such 
individual's age . . . ." 
 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2).  However, finding the theory lurking in 
this section requires reading the language "because of such 
individual's age" to modify "adversely affect" rather than to 
modify "limit, segregate, or classify."  Because of the placement 
of the commas, this is a grammatically incorrect reading.  See 
Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact 
Doctrine, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 837, 842-43 (1982).  Moreover, as Krop 
points out, section (2) parallels the language of section (1), 
which makes it unlawful for an employer -- 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual or otherwise discriminate 
(..continued) 
the Eighth Circuit assumed -- again without analysis --  that 
disparate impact liability is cognizable under the ADEA.  See 
Houghton v. Sipco, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 958-59 (8th Cir. 1994). 
  
against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's age. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a).  "Under this provision, the 'because of such 
individual's age' clause can only modify the description of 
prohibited actions . . . . The parallel wording of section 
4(a)(2) indicates that it too was aimed at disparate treatment.  
An employer may not limit, segregate, or classify employees on 
the basis of age in a manner that would adversely affect an 
employee."  Krop at 843. 
 More than that, however, although the ADEA language 
quoted above parallels the language in Title VII, when the 
Supreme Court found disparate impact liability under Title VII, 
it relied not on any specific statutory language but on the 
policies behind the statute.  In that case, Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971), the Court stated: 
 The objective of Congress in the enactment of 
Title VII . . . was to achieve equality of 
employment opportunities and remove barriers 
that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees.  Under the Act, practices, 
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot 
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the 
status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices. 
 
Id. at 429-30, 91 S.Ct. at 853.  This policy is not easily 
transplanted into the ADEA, the primary purpose of which is to 
prohibit employers from acting upon the assumption that 
  
"productivity and competence decline with old age."  Hazen, ____ 
U.S. at ____, 113 S.Ct. at 1706.  As one court has put it, "[i]n 
Griggs, the critical fact was the link between the history of 
educational discrimination and the use of that discrimination as 
a means of presently disadvantaging African-Americans.  These 
concerns simply are not present when the alleged disparate impact 
is based on age."  Hiatt, 859 F. Supp. at 1436.  Congress itself 
recognized this distinction, for it provided in the ADEA that 
"[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any 
action otherwise prohibited [by this section] where the 
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age . . 
. ."  29 U.S.C. §623(f)(1).  "The sentence is incomprehensible 
unless the prohibition forbids disparate treatment and the 
exception authorized disparate impact."  Metz v. Transit Mix, 
Inc., 828 F.2d 1202, 1220 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J. 
dissenting) (quoting Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, 
Disparate Impact in Compensation, and Other Title VII Issues, 49 
L. & Contemp. Prob. 53, 55 (Aut. 1986) (referring to identical 
language of Equal Pay Act).  In other words, by the statutory 
language itself, Congress recognized that neutral policies not 
motivated by discriminatory intent may be permissible employment 
practices.  It is difficult to imagine how Congress could have 
concluded otherwise -- for application of disparate impact theory 
could lead to results which Congress probably did not intend.21 
                     
21
.  For example, if an employer set the work week at five days 
per week, eight hours per day, or if it determined to eliminate 
  
 But I need not go so far as to say that disparate 
impact theory is never available under the ADEA.  Rather, 
resolution of that issue must await another day.  I write this 
section to highlight my doubts and to say that, at any rate, 
disparate impact theory should not be applied as a matter of 
course.  Here, of course, we only need hold that even if in some 
situations disparate impact liability may be established under 
the ADEA, this case does not present one of them.   
  
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 In view of the aforesaid, we hold that an employer may 
offer enhanced benefits to all terminated employees agreeing to 
waive all claims against the company, without providing extra 
consideration to workers protected by the ADEA.  Thus, it is 
evident that the district court should have denied DiBiase's 
motion for summary judgment and should have granted SmithKline's 
motion for summary judgment on count 2 of the amended complaint.  
Furthermore, it is clear that there is no need for further 
proceedings in the district court.  See Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 
(..continued) 
medical insurance coverage, its decisions could have a disparate 
impact on older employees.  In that circumstance, in an ADEA 
action employers would be forced to justify their business 
practices with older employees then having the opportunity to 
demonstrate that alternative employment practices could fulfill 
the employer's needs.  See Abbott v. Federal Forge, Inc., 912 
F.2d 867, 872 (6th Cir. 1990).  Such a regime could subject 
employers to unreasonable intrusions by juries into their 
business practices.  See Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 
1070, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992). 
  
1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 1991).  Consequently, the order of May 3, 
1994, granting DiBiase summary judgment will be reversed and the 
matter will be remanded to the district court for entry of 
judgment in favor of SmithKline. 
            
 
 
 
 
